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Abstract
Mobile web browsers now provide nearly equivalent fea-
tures when compared to their desktop counterparts. How-
ever, smaller screen size and optimized features for con-
strained hardware make the web experience on mobile
browsers significantly different. In this paper, we present
the first comprehensive study of the display-related security
issues in mobile browsers. We identify two new classes of
display-related security problems in mobile browsers and de-
vise a range of real world attacks against them. Addition-
ally, we identify an existing security policy for display on
desktop browsers that is inappropriate on mobile browsers.
Our analysis is comprised of eight mobile and five desktop
browsers. We compare security policies for display in the
candidate browsers to infer that desktop browsers are signif-
icantly more compliant with the policies as compared to mo-
bile browsers. We conclude that mobile browsers create new
security challenges and are not simply miniature versions of
their desktop counterparts.
1 Introduction
Mobile web browsers have long underperformed their desk-
top counterparts. Whether by implementing limited al-
ternative standards such as WAP [34] or incomplete ver-
sions of HTML, the first mobile browsers provided a mea-
ger set of capabilities and attracted only a small number of
early adopters. However, recent improvements in processing
power and bandwidth have spurred significant changes in the
ways users experience the mobile web.
Modern mobile browsers are now able to render complex
webpages that contain many popular embedded elements
(e.g., Javascript). The most popular browsers, including
iPhone Safari, Android, Opera Mini and Blackberry (v6.0+),
even rely on the same rendering engines [15, 14] used by
many desktop browsers. Accordingly, screen size is now ar-
guably one of the most distinguishable differences between
mobile and desktop platforms. However, this difference is
more than cosmetic. Specifically, there exists a fundamen-
tal tension between a user’s ability to see large sections of a
webpage and concurrently interact with any of its individual
elements. The difficulty in efficiently accessing large pages
on mobile devices makes an adversary capable of abusing
the rendering of display elements particularly acute from a
security perspective.
In this paper, we characterize a number of differences in
the ways mobile and desktop browsers render webpages that
potentially allow an adversary to deceive mobile users into
performing unwanted and potentially dangerous operations.
Specifically, we examine the handling of user interaction
with overlapped display elements, the ability of malicious
cross-origin elements to affect the placement of honest el-
ements and the ability of malicious cross-origin elements
to alter the navigation of honest parent and descendant el-
ements. We then perform the same tests against a number
of desktop browsers and find that the majority of desktop
browsers are not vulnerable to the same rendering issues.
We show that such attacks are due to the lack of enforce-
ment of display security policies and exacerbated by screen
size limitations, making many such attacks difficult for users
to detect.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• Propose a new security policy for event handling for
overlapped elements: Browsers currently make only
one access decision when the pixels of two elements
overlap - which element owns the visual property of a
pixel (display). We argue that browsers must also en-
force which element should then respond to user access
to that pixel and define a policy reflecting this decision.
We then show that failure to enforce this policy renders
browsers susceptible to a range of attacks including lo-
gin CSRF and click fraud.
• Evaluate pertinence and enforcement of previously
proposed display security policies: Recent work in
this space has resulted in the proposal and implemen-
tation of a number of security policies for display el-
ements in the desktop space. We evaluate the rele-
vance of navigation policies [10] for desktop browsers
in mobile browsers, demonstrate a widespread lack of
enforcement of policies regarding display access [36]
and demonstrate that such oversights expose mobile
1
browsers to attacks including phishing and password
stealing.
• Perform tests against a wide-range of the most pop-
ular mobile and desktop browsers: We explore com-
pliance with display security policies on eight mo-
bile (Android Mobile, Blackberry (Mango), Blackberry
(Webkit), Firefox Mobile, Nokia Mini-Map, Opera
Mini, iPhone Safari and Internet Explorer Mobile) and
five desktop (Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Opera
and Safari) browsers. Our experiments reveal a range of
rendering vulnerabilities that potentially allow an ad-
versary to force users to perform dangerous actions al-
most exclusively in mobile browsers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 discusses background information, our methodology
and presents our threat model; Section 3 presents our pol-
icy regarding user access to overlapping elements and eval-
uates its enforcement in current browsers; Section 4 eval-
uates compliance with the display access policy as it re-
lates to cross-origin elements; Section 5 examines the ability
of cross-origin elements to influence navigation; Section 7
provides higher-level observations and potential mitigation
costs; Section 8 provides context for this work in terms of
related work; Section 9 offers concluding thoughts.
2 Overview
In this section, we provide an overview of display elements
and rendering techniques for mobile browsers. We then dis-
cuss our experimental methodology and define our threat
model and potential adversaries.
2.1 Display Handling in Mobile Browsers
Content not fitting the window in early HTML-capable mo-
bile browsers would either be wrapped or would not be dis-
played at all [2]. Modern mobile browsers adapt to such dif-
ferences using a range of techniques. For many webpages,
mobile browsers attempt to display as much as possible and
scale content based on the width and height of the browser.
This approach can make content on a webpage appear very
small and unreadable. Users must then move to and zoom
in to the area containing the desired content. To avoid user
effort, a growing number of pages instead rely on the “view-
port” metatag. This metatag allows web developers to con-
trol the size and initial zoom level of the content and also
constrain the user’s control of scaling the page. Mobile spe-
cific CSS files [12] and compression of webpage content for
a phone screen [2] are other techniques used for handling
small screen size.
Scaling the page to the device’s dimensions or zooming
may not necessarily provide the best user experience. Some
websites instead design pages specific to mobile screensi
which look considerably different from their desktop coun-
terparts. Such pages contain limited content and often pro-








IE on Windows 7 phone OS etc.) 3.25
Table 1: Market Share of Popular Mobile Browsers as of
January 2011. We cover approximately 90.5% of the mobile
browsers in the market for our evaluation.
Landlord Tenant
position(x,y,z) RW
dimensions (height, width) RW R
pixels RW
URL location W RW
Table 2: Access control policy for landlord and its cross-
original tenant as defined by Wang et al [36]. Only the land-
lord controls the position and dimensions of the tenant. Only
the tenant can read and write his own pixels. The landlord
can overlay the tenant completely with other content.
vide a subset of functionalities. For example, Facebook’s
mobile web page does not provide the chat feature found in
the desktop version. Many mobile pages also offer the abil-
ity to navigate to the standard version of the webpage should
the user prefer it.
Regardless of the method used to display content on a mo-
bile browser, it is difficult to display large amounts of content
and allow users to meaningfully interact with that content at
the same time. Accordingly, poorly defined policies regard-
ing how content is rendered by mobile browsers put users of
these platforms at greater security risk than those of tradi-
tional desktop browsers.
2.2 Methodology
We analyze the rendering differences between popular desk-
top and mobile browsers for security. Existing desktop and
mobile browsers do not have well defined and standardized
security policies for display. Wang et al. [36] and Singh et
al. [31] have previously studied display security in desktop
browsers. In this work, we analyze mobile browsers and pro-
vide the first comprehensive study of their display properties.
In particular, we propose a new policy to define proper han-
dling of user access to overlapped pixels, evaluate previously
proposed display access policies for display [36] and then
study the window navigation policies that have been previ-
ously explored as part of display policies.
To verify the compliance of the security policies for dis-
play, we study eight mobile and five desktop browsers. Our
study explores display security for approximately 90.5% of
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Type Browser Name Version Rendering Engine Operating System Device
Mobile
Opera Mini 5.5.1 Presto Android 2.2.1 Nexus 1
Safari * Webkit iOS 4.1 (8B117) iPhone
Android 2.2.1 Webkit Android 2.2.1 Nexus 1
Blackberry 5.0.0 Mango Blackberry OS 5.0.0.732 Bold 9650
Blackberry 6.0.0 Webkit Blackberry OS 6 Torch 9800
Nokia Mini-Map * Webkit Symbian S60 E71x
Internet Explorer * Trident Windows Phone Samsung focus
Mobile 7.0.7004.0 OS SGH-i917
Firefox Mobile 4 Beta 3 Gecko Android 2.2.1 Nexus 1
Desktop
Opera 11.00 Presto OS X 10.6.5 –
Safari 5.0.3 Webkit OS X 10.6.5 –
Chrome 8.0.552.237 Webkit OS X 10.6.5 –
Firefox 3.5.16 Gecko OS X 10.6.5 –
Internet Explorer 8.0.7600.16385 Trident Windows 7 –
Table 3: Details of browsers used for experimental evaluation. We consider eight mobile and five desktop browsers. *: After
thorough search for version numbers of these browsers, we could not find their specifications. We have used the default
browsers shipped with the referenced version of the OS.
mobile browsers in the market [8]. Table 1 provides a break-
down of market share. Some of the browser vendors have
platform specific browser versions - the Opera browser is
available for Android, iPhone and a range of other platforms.
In such cases, we choose one platform specific browser to
perform our experiments. For example, we select the Opera
Mini browser on an Android handset for our evaluation. Ad-
ditionally, we evaluate only the iPhone Safari browser and
argue that the iTouch Safari browser will have the same
results as both devices run the same operating system and
browser.
We define a ‘display element’ as any HTML element that
can color pixels on the screen. For example, iframe,
image, text, text area, link, table, button and
list all fall under display elements. However, HTML el-
ements such as head, input or option do not qualify
as display elements. We create test cases consisting of dis-
play elements and study their security policies under dif-
ferent settings. For example, we study the security poli-
cies of cross-origin display elements: when they overlap,
when they access each other’s display resources and when
they are navigated to new sources. We run each of our test
cases on all the candidate browsers. We experimentally dis-
cover several vulnerabilities in popular mobile browsers due
to non-compliance with security policies for display. We
then describe potential attacks exploiting these vulnerabil-
ities on mobile browsers. Additionally, we identify an ex-
isting display-related security policy on desktop browsers
that is inappropriate on mobile browsers. Finally, we pro-
vide a comparison between mobile and desktop browsers for
display-related security.
Our evaluation explores both new and previously pro-
posed policies for display security. After proposing our own
policy, we evaluate mobile browsers for compliance with
the access control matrix for display as defined by Wang et
al [36]. The matrix is shown for convenience in Table 2. The
position attribute describes a display element’s situation on
the parent’s page and dimensions define the area covered by
the element. URL location is the path to the element’s re-
source. Pixels refer to the actual private display content of
the element. We extend the definition of pixels by including
the user interaction with the tenant’s pixels as part of private
content of the tenant.
Table 3 provides details of each of the browsers used for
evaluation. All our tests were performed on browsers on real
mobile phones, and are recreated in the respective emulators
to create many of the figures throughout the paper. In addi-
tion to the top six browsers in the market (Table 1), we also
perform experiments on IE on Windows 7 phone OS and
the Firefox Mobile browser on Android. Our evaluation was
completed on January 14th 2011.
2.3 Threat Model
We present three classes of adversaries. Each adversary tries
to do one or more of the following: elevate his own privi-
leges, attack other website principals or attack the user. Each
adversary has knowledge of the security vulnerabilities in
the display of mobile browsers. We describe the abilities
and intention of each adversary and state the potential tech-
niques that can be used by the adversary to attract victims to
his content.
2.3.1 Landlord attacker
The landlord attacker is a malicious principal who can host
his own websites such as landlordattacker.com. After host-
ing a malicious website, the landlord attacker hosts honest
tenants on his website. A “tenant” is a principal who rents an
area on a landlord’s website to render his own content such
as advertisements. After the landlord gets honest tenants
on his website, he tries to exploit the honest tenant and/or
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the honest user. The landlord has no control on the con-
tent of the tenant’s rented area on the screen (Same Origin
Policy). He controls the external properties of the tenant’s
rented area. For example, the landlord can specify the di-
mensions, transparency and position of the tenant’s area on
his website. However, he cannot interfere with the content in
the tenant’s rented area. The landlord instead tries to attack
the honest tenant and honest user by manipulating his own
website display.
We note that not every user visiting landlordattacker.com
will be exploited. Depending on the vulnerability that the
landlord attacker is trying to exploit, the honest tenant and
honest user may be attacked only when landlordattacker.com
is rendered in a vulnerable browser. Placing web advertise-
ments, displaying popular content indexed by search engines
and sending bulk e-mail to users are some of the techniques
that the landlord attacker can use to attract users to his web-
site [21].
2.3.2 Tenant attacker
The tenant attacker is a malicious principal who can rent an
area of the display on a website owned by an honest land-
lord. For example, the tenant attacker can insert a malicious
advertisement or gadget in an honest website. Websites such
as iGoogle allow any user having an account with them to
upload a new gadget. Placing ads on honest websites is an-
other way that the tenant attacker can insert malicious con-
tent in an honest website.
We assume that an honest user visits an honest website
containing at least one tenant attacker area, on a vulnerable
mobile browser. The tenant attacker has knowledge of the
display vulnerabilities in the popular mobile browsers. He
manipulates the content of his rented area on honest websites
to attack the honest website and/or the user.
2.3.3 User attacker
The user attacker is a malicious user who wants to access re-
stricted content on honest websites such as honest.com. The
user has access to a range of mobile browsers and is knowl-
edgeable of the display vulnerabilities in mobile browsers.
His goal is to access restricted content on honest websites by
exploiting these vulnerabilities.
The user attacker cannot tamper with the content and dis-
play of honest.com. He can only exploit the security vulner-
abilities in mobile browsers to access unrestricted content on
honest.com.
3 User Access to Overlapping Elements
When two or more elements share the same pixel on the
screen, browsers must make two ownership decisions:
which element owns the visual property (display) of the
pixel and which element owns and responds to the user
access to that pixel (user access). ‘Display’ belongs to the
element that can manipulate the color of a pixel. We argue
that in addition to following a security policy to constrain
ownership of display of pixels, defining a security policy
for ‘user access to pixels’ is equally crucial. We propose
the following policy that addresses ownership of user access:
User Access to Overlapping Elements: When two or
more elements of any origin share the same pixel on the
screen, the element on top should own and respond to
the user access to the pixel, even if the top element is
transparent.
This policy constrains the ownership of user access to
overlapped pixels to a single principal. This behavior is dif-
ferent than the behavior of display ownership followed by
popular desktop browsers (excluding IE 8 on Windows 7).
The display of a pixel shared by overlapped elements, is
owned by the first element on the top of a set of overlapping
elements holding non-transparent data. If the top element
does not render content at a pixel, the element immediately
below it is given ownership of the display regardless of its
origin. The first completely opaque element in a stack of
overlapping elements becomes the final element sharing the
display in the overlapped area. All the elements beneath the
opaque element are not seen.
We argue that the ‘user access’ to overlapped pixels
should not be shared and should be owned only by the top
element’s principal irrespective of its transparency. This pol-
icy should hold even if the overlapping elements are from the
same-origin (Section 3.1.4). Our proposed policy for over-
lapping elements is currently the default behavior of the ma-
jority of the popular desktop browsers, although it has not
previously been formally specified. While mobile browsers
follow the ownership policy for display of pixels in over-
lapped area, we will show that most mobile browsers do not
comply with the user access ownership policy and therefore
are vulnerable to a range of attacks as follows. 1
3.1 Attacks
We discuss potential attacks against browsers that do not
comply with our proposed policy. Depending on the vul-
nerability in the browser, all three adversaries described
in Section 2.3 can formulate attacks against non-compliant
browsers.
3.1.1 Login CSRF
A browser not complying with the user access policy for
overlapping elements is susceptible to the login CSRF
(Cross Site Request Forgery) attack similar to one described
by Barth et al. [20]. While previous work used DNS exploits
1Note that our proposed policy does not prevent all possible attacks (e.g.
imitation attacks) due to overlapping elements. We discuss this in Sec-
tion 3.3.
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Figure 1: Left image: Login page of www.yahoo.com included in an iframe on www.landlordattacker.com; Right image:
Image overlapping the www.yahoo.com iframe on www.landlordattacker.com. The text boxes for ‘solving’ the CAPTCHAs
are placed exactly above the email and password fields on yahoo.com. The verify button is placed exactly above the ‘sign in’
button of yahoo.com. The two CAPTCHAs are the real email and password of the attacker’s google account. The Android
(pictured), Opera Mini, Nokia and Firefox Mobile browsers are vulnerable to this attack.
to launch the attack, we show that a similar attack is feasible
due to a browser’s non-compliance to our proposed display
policy. The intention of an attacker in a login CSRF is to
make the honest user’s browser log in as the attacker into a
legitimate website without any notice to the user. A browser
allowing user access to elements placed below an opaque
display element is vulnerable to the login CSRF attack.
Consider a malicious website landlordattacker.com. The
landlord includes a legitimate iframe containing the ‘sign in’
page of www.yahoo.com as shown in Figure 1. The landlord
then overlaps the iframe completely with an opaque image
as shown in Figure 1. The image shows enticing free con-
tent on the landlord’s website and includes two CAPTCHAs
expected to be solved by the user to access the free content.
The intention of the landlord attacker is to make the user
enter the attacker’s credentials into the hidden iframe below
the opaque image. The landlord accomplishes this by setting
the two CAPTCHAs to the email and password of the at-
tacker’s Yahoo account. The landlord attacker then carefully
places each of the solution boxes of the CAPTCHAs on the
image exactly overlapping the email and password fields of
the Yahoo iframe below the opaque image. The ‘Verify’ but-
ton on the image of the CAPTCHAs is exactly overlapped
with the ‘Sign in’ button of the Yahoo iframe below.
When an honest user visits landlordattacker.com, he
solves the two CAPTCHAs on the image to view free con-
tent. Since the browser allows user access to the text area
below the image, when the user fills in the CAPTCHA on
top, he actually fills in the username and password of the at-
tacker in the Yahoo iframe below the image. Once the user
clicks the verify button on the image, the ‘sign in’ button
on the Yahoo iframe gets clicked logging the user’s browser
into www.yahoo.com as the attacker.
Solving a CAPTCHA does not give out private user in-
formation and is perceived as a security feature of the web-
site. Therefore, even a careful user would likely be willing
to solve the CAPTCHA. Because the top image is opaque,
the user is completely oblivious to the consequences of his
seemingly benign action of solving the CAPTCHA.
Once the attacker is logged in from the user browser,
all the consequences of login CSRF described by Barth et
al. [20] are possible. The victim’s search history on Yahoo
search engine would be stored in the attacker’s account af-
ter the attack is successful. Since Yahoo is a single sign-
on website, all the other websites accessible by logging into
www.yahoo.com once would be logged into as the attacker.
For example, Yahoo offers a wide variety of websites such as
shopping, finance, health etc. If the user browses to sensitive
content such as health issues, his actions may be logged into
the attacker’s account.
3.1.2 Click Fraud
Any malicious principal (landlord or tenant) can execute a
click fraud attack by exploiting non-compliance with the
proposed user access policy as shown in Figure 2.
AdSense is one of Google’s advertising programs. The
advertisements that Google shows on a website are relevant
to the website’s content. A malicious principal can create an
AdSense account free of charge and embed relevant content
on his page to attract advertisements. The malicious prin-
cipal earns money from Google when a user clicks on an
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mesothelioma-find-lawyer.com
Figure 2: Left image: Image advertisement of sales in San Francisc on the www.yelp.com website ; Right image: The actual
image placed below the enticing sales advertisement. A user clicks on the asbestos advertisements earn the attacker more
money. The tenant on www.yelp.com is malicious and places the honest asbestos advertisement in an iframe and overlays it
with the more enticing images of sales in San Francisco to increase the rate of clicks. Due to the vulnerability in the Opera
Mini browser, when a user clicks on the sale advertisement in San Francisco, the asbestos advertisement is clicked benefiting
the tenant attacker on Yelp. The Android, Opera Mini (pictured), iPhone Safari, Nokia and Firefox Mobile are vulnerable to
the click fraud attack.
advertisement placed by Google AdSense. He cannot ma-
nipulate the advertisement placed by Google and thus can-
not trick a user into clicking on an unwanted advertisement
by disguising an AdSense advertisement with more enticing
content.
If a browser allows a user to access content below an
opaque element, the malicious principal can launch a click
fraud attack. The attacker can include high paying adver-
tisements such as advertisements for mesothelioma [1] and
overlap each of them with more enticing content. If an hon-
est user accesses the area containing the attractive content,
the advertisements below would be clicked, benefiting the
attacker.
3.1.3 Snooping
A malicious landlord can also learn about the interactions
of the user with his cross-origin tenant by exploiting non-
compliance with the proposed policy. If display elements sit-
uated below an opaque element respond to the user access in-
stead of the element on top, a malicious landlord can launch
a snooping attack. For example, consider a malicious page
embedding an opaque cross-origin image advertisement with
a click event. The expected behavior of onclick on the im-
age is navigation of user’s browser to the webpage of the ad-
vertiser. However, the malicious landlord can fill the entire
screen area below the image with display elements whose
onclick event implies user access to the advertisement in
the image on top. Due to the incorrect handling of user ac-
cess to overlapped pixels, if the user clicks on the image ad-
vertisement, the click event of the buttons below the image
will be executed. This browser behavior will allow a ma-
licious landlord to monitor the interaction of the user with
the honest tenant breaching the access control policy in a
landlord-tenant setting.
3.1.4 Escalation of User Privileges
The incorrect handling of user access ownership can allow a
user adversary to elevate his privileges and access otherwise
restricted data. For example, many free content hosting sites
require the user to either fill out a survey or view an adver-
tisement before accessing links to free online data. Web sites
generally put a transparent iframe containing the survey on
top of their webpage to avoid a user clicking on the links
below. The transparency allows a user to view the content
and the overlapped iframe is expected to block the user from
clicking on the links. If a vulnerable browser allows a user to
click through transparent iframes, the user adversary would
simply render the webpage hosting the free content on that
browser. If the bottom iframe containing the links to the free
content also responds to the user access to overlapped pix-
els, the user adversary would be able to click on the links
through the transparent iframe on top. Similar attack is pos-
sible when there is the bottom web page holds content out
of the user’s view. The user is expected to take the survey
and then scroll to the hidden content. If the user is allowed
to move to the otherwise hidden content by scrolling the bot-
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tom iframe, he would be able to view the content restricted
by the website. This will result in the malicious user easily
bypassing the survey and breaking the expected behavior of
the webpage. Even though the iframe containing the links to
free content and the iframe containing the survey are from
the same origin, it is important that only the top iframe re-
sponds to user access to the overlapped pixels.
3.2 Experimental Evaluation
We constructed a range of test cases to verify compliance
with the proposed policy and ran them on the candidate
browsers given in Section 2.2.
We observed that iframes in all the desktop and mo-
bile browsers (except the IE desktop and mobile version),
are transparent by default. Unless the developer colors an
iframe, its ”allowtransparency” property is set to true. We
analyzed this default behavior of overlapping iframes in our
candidate browsers. All desktop browsers except Safari fol-
low the proposed policy correctly when iframes with the
default transparency property overlap. In Safari, if two or
more iframes of any origin overlap, a user is able to scroll all
the contiguous transparent iframes from the top in the over-
lapped area. A user cannot scroll any iframe below the first
opaque iframe from the top. This behavior may allow a user
adversary to access otherwise restricted data in the bottom
iframes by scrolling to the desired content leading to the es-
calation of user privileges attack.
Five (Android, Opera Mini, Nokia, Firefox Mobile and
iPhone Safari) out of the eight mobile browsers do not cor-
rectly follow the proposed policy for overlapping elements.
The browsers show different vulnerabilities leading to non-
compliance of the proposed policy. Therefore, the potential
attacks on each mobile browser vary. We will cover the most
dangerous vulnerabilities that we discovered.
When transparent iframes overlap and share display pix-
els, the element owning the first colored pixel in the stack
responds to the user access to the shared pixel in the An-
droid and Opera Mini browsers. For example, a non-colored
shared display pixel in the top iframe allows the user to ac-
cess the first colored pixel immediately below it. The user
can click buttons, write in text areas and also initiate events
such as onmouseover and onmouseout2 on the iframes
beneath. We note that to click a button or write in a text
area, the user does not require access to all the pixels for
that object. If the user can click on any part of the button
accessible to him, he is able to initiate the event on that but-
ton. Similarly, if the user can access any part of the text area,
he can type in it even though part of the text area is hidden
behind an opaque element. As described in Section 3.1, a
user attacker can break a website’s behavior and access in-
formation by exploiting this security flaw in the Android and
Opera Mini browsers.
The iPhone Safari browser also allows a user to access
restricted content by exploiting its non-compliance to the
2The onmouseover and onmouseout events are supported on the
majority of mobile browsers.
proposed policy. We observe the exact same vulnerability
in iPhone Safari as its desktop counterpart. If two or more
iframes of any origin overlap, the user is able to scroll all the
contiguous transparent iframes from the top.
We observe that incorrect handling of user access in over-
lapping elements is not restricted only to transparent display
elements. If two opaque images overlap, the bottom image
is accessible through the top image in the overlapped area on
the Android and Opera Mini browsers. We note that the bot-
tom image is accessible only when the corners of the images
overlap. Events such as onclick and onmouseover are
executed through the opaque overlapped area of the images.
This problem may subject a user to clickjacking while sim-
ply browsing a webpage containing cross-origin overlapped
images.
The Opera Mini and Nokia Mini-Map browsers present
more vulnerabilities in handling user access to overlapping
opaque elements. Even if the opaque image on top has an
onlick event defined, the button below the image responds
in the Opera Mini browser completely ignoring the click
event of the top element. Similarly, in the Nokia Mini-Map
browser, the onclick events of the text areas and links be-
low an opaque image get precedence while completely ig-
noring the onlick event of the top image. If the top opaque
image does not have an event defined, elements such as but-
tons and text areas situated below the image are accessible
to the user in both browsers. As explained in Section 3.1,
this vulnerability makes the Opera Mini and the Nokia Mini-
Map browsers susceptible to the login CSRF and snooping
attacks. The Firefox Mobile and Android browsers have a
similar vulnerability. They allow access to hidden text area
through opaque images. We note that the login CSRF attack
is possible on the Android and Firefox Mobile browsers even
though they do not allow user access to a button below an
opaque image. We successfully built the login CSRF attack
described in Figure 1 on the Android browser. The attack
is possible because pressing the ‘enter’ key on the keyboard
can also log a user in the attacker’s account once the user
has filled in the username and password. Therefore, instead
of asking the user to press the fake ‘verify’ button on the
screen, an attacker can simply ask the user to ‘Press Enter’
on their keypad after solving the CAPTCHAs. Therefore,
the Opera Mini, Nokia Mini-Map, Android and Firefox Mo-
bile browsers are susceptible to the both the login CSRF and
the snooping attacks. We note that the same attack would
work on all the aforementioned vulnerable browsers.
The Blackberry browsers built on Mango and Webkit en-
gine correctly follow the user access policy for overlapping
elements for our test cases. Similar to the desktop browsers,
only the top website principal holds the ownership of user
access to the overlapped pixels in Blackberry browsers.
The IE 8 browser on Windows 7 desktop does not support
same or cross-original overlapping transparent iframes. The
top element of an overlay is made opaque even though its
transparency property is set to true. Therefore, when two or
more transparent iframes overlap, both the display and user
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Landlord
Google iPhone Opera Nokia Firefox Windows Blackberry Blackberry
Android Safari Mini Mini-Map Mobile IE Mango Webkit
position (x,y,z) RW RW RW RW RW RW RW RW
dimensions (height, width) RW RW RW RW RW RW RW RW
pixels R∗ – R∗ R∗ R∗ – – –
URL location W W W – W W W W
Table 4: Policies for a landlord to access a cross-origin tenant’s position, dimensions, pixels and URL location. R∗: The
Android, Opera Mini and Firefox Mobile browsers allow a landlord to read the user interaction with its cross-original tenant.
This vulnerability breaches the access control policy for the tenant’s ‘pixels’ allowing the landlord to launch a snooping
attack.
access of the overlapped area is owned by the top element.
Similar behavior is seen in the IE browser on Windows 7
phone OS. Although both browsers follow a different display
ownership policy for transparent iframes, they both follow
our proposed principal for transparent and opaque elements.
3.3 Discussion
Our experiments show that the majority of the popular mo-
bile browsers do not handle the user access to overlapping
elements correctly. Five out of the eight candidate mobile
browsers are vulnerable to a range of attacks such as login
CSRF, clickjacking and elevation of user privileges due to
not following the user access policy correctly. We note that
these vulnerabilities are prevalent in the mobile browsers
whereas desktop browsers (excluding Safari) implement the
policy correctly. This result defies the expected assumption
that browsers from the same vendors automatically imple-
ment similar security policies. Although Safari desktop and
iPhone Safari show the same vulnerability, the Opera Mini
and Firefox Mobile browsers behave very differently when
compared to their desktop counterparts.
If a landlord can snoop on the interaction between a user
and the landlord’s cross-origin tenant (Section 3.1.3), we
consider that as a violation of the access control policy due
to the ability of the landlord to read the private content of the
tenant. Table 4 shows our evaluation of the access policies
for a landlord on different browsers. We note that allowing
READ access to a tenant’s pixels (user interaction) makes
the Android, Opera Mini, Firefox Mobile, Nokia Mini-Map
and iPhone Safari browsers susceptible to snooping.
We note that following our proposed policy does not pre-
vent all possible attacks when cross-origin elements over-
lap. For example, if a malicious transparent iframe is placed
exactly on top of the login box of an honest landlord, ac-
cording to our policy, the transparent iframe will own the
control of user access to the overlapped area. When the user
enters his login credentials in the login box, he actually sub-
mits his credentials to the malicious iframe. Such attacks
can be prevented if our policy is extended to include the
‘opaque overlay policy’ proposed by Wang et al [36]. The
opaque policy allows only same origin windows to transpar-
ently overlay with one another. Additionally, cross-origin
windows are allowed to overlay only when the top window
is opaque. Therefore, attacks caused due to overlapping of
transparent cross-origin elements can be prevented using the
opaque policy. However, the opaque overlay policy does not
allow cross-origin drop down menus or cross-origin trans-
parent overlapping advertisements. This behavior restricts
browser functionality and can break website logic. Accord-
ingly, most modern browsers do not follow the opaque over-
lay policy; however, the majority of browsers do support
overlay of cross-origin transparent elements. We also note
that the opaque overlay policy does not completely provide
cross-principal event protection in overlapped elements by
itself. If a cross-principal opaque element at the top shares
its control of user access with the bottom element, the logic
of the webpage is broken and it becomes vulnerable to at-
tacks. We therefore conclude that defining policies only for
display of overlapped elements is not sufficient. Uniquely
identifying the owner of the user access of overlapped pix-
els in addition to ownership of display is crucial for cross-
principal event protection in overlapped elements.
We note that even if our proposed policy is extended to
include the opaque policy, imitation attacks caused by over-
lapping of opaque elements are not solved. For example,
consider a malicious iframe imitating the Google login page
overlapping on top of the actual Google login iframe. The
opaque policy will allow this cross-origin overlap and our
policy would restrict the control of user access to the mali-
cious iframe. A user will perceive the malicious iframe as
the real Google login page and will be easily subjected to a
password stealing attack. A potential solution to this prob-
lem could be to change the browser GUI such that the user
sees the actual URI location of the content he interacts with
all the time. This solution will require changes to all the
existing browsers. Another potential solution to prevent all
the security issues with overlapped elements is to remove
the support for overlapping elements in browsers. This is an
extreme solution and would break the logic of a large num-
ber of websites. For example, 6.2% websites out of the top
100,000 contain at least one pair of overlapping frames [31]
and would be broken if overlapping elements are not sup-
ported by browsers. Additionally, there may be other web-
sites containing overlapping display elements other than just
iframes. Therefore, we deem both the plausible solutions to
imitation attacks to be difficult to realize.
8
Figure 3: Left image: Layout of the malicious and honest widgets on the mashup webpage. ‘ATTACKER’ is a malicious
widget and Amazon and YouTube are honest widgets; Right image: The browser allows a cross-origin tenant to read and
write its own dimensions. The malicious widget expands its own dimensions and masquerades as the honest Amazon and
YouTube widgets on the browser. It pushes the honest widgets south and launches a phishing attack on the user. This attack
works in the iPhone Safari (pictured), Android and Opera Mini browsers.
4 Display Access for Cross-origin Elements
In Section 3, we concluded that to completely secure
browsers from attacks caused by overlapping elements, the
extreme solution would be to remove the support for overlap-
ping elements from browsers. In our evaluation of display in
mobile browsers, we observed that mobile browsers bring in
new security challenges even when there are no overlapping
elements. In this section, we study vulnerabilities in mobile
browsers when each display pixel’s visual and user access
properties are completely owned by only one principal.
Complex websites often contain one or more cross-origin
tenants in the form of advertisements or gadgets. In such
a setting, both the landlord and the tenant have to protect
themselves from each other. Websites rely on browsers to
provide access control guarantees when cross-origin princi-
pals interact. Wang et al [36] defined an access control ma-
trix for display in a cross-origin landlord-tenant setting for
the Gazelle browser as shown in Table 2. Previous stud-
ies [31] have evaluated compliance with the display access
control policies proposed by Gazelle on desktop browsers.
We advocate the display access control policies proposed in
Gazelle in a cross-origin landlord-tenant setting and evaluate
the compliance with the policy on mobile browsers.
Similar to earlier work on access control policy for dis-
play [36, 31], we evaluate the read and write access control
policy for position, dimensions, pixels and URL location of
a cross-origin tenant. According to the access control matrix
defined in Gazelle, when a landlord rents an area on his web-
page to a cross-origin tenant, he should be able to control
the position and dimensions of the tenant. However, once
rented, the landlord should not be able to read the private
content of the tenant’s pixels, the URL location of the tenant
or change the tenant’s logic by writing over its pixels. The
tenant should not be able to resize or position itself on the
landlord’s screen.
If the access control policies in a cross-origin landlord-
tenant setting are not followed, honest principals become
vulnerable to the following attacks.
4.1 Attacks
If a browser incorrectly implements the access control pol-
icy for dimensions of a tenant, a malicious tenant is able to
attack honest landlord and the user. We present two potential
attacks on this browser vulnerability.
4.1.1 Phishing
A browser allowing a cross-origin tenant to read and write
its own dimensions is vulnerable to phishing attacks.
Consider the iGoogle mashup as shown in Figure 3. A
mashup combines data or functionalities from more than one
source to provide a new service. The landlord in a mashup
is the principal hosting all the functionalities in the form of
widgets, which are generally tenants from other origins. Any
user having an account with the landlord is allowed to upload
and publish a new widget on the mashup website. Other




Google iPhone Opera Nokia Firefox Windows Blackberry Blackberry
Android Safari Mini Mini-Map Mobile IE Mango Webkit
position (x,y,z) – – – – – – – –
dimensions (height, width) RW ∗ RW ∗ RW ∗ R R – R R
pixels RW RW RW RW RW RW RW RW
URL location RW RW RW RW RW RW RW RW
Table 5: Policies for a tenant of a cross-origin landlord to access its own position on the landlord’s page, its dimensions, its
URL location and its pixel content. RW ∗: Android, iPhone Safari and Opera Mini browsers allow a cross-origin tenant to
write its own dimensions and thus become susceptible to phishing attacks.
Each widget in the mashup is contained inside an iframe
on the landlord’s page. Consider a malicious widget AT-
TACKER. After an honest user adds the widget to his profile,
it is placed “North” of an honest widget Amazon as shown in
Figure 3. The honest user browses online deals through the
Amazon website and makes purchases of items of his choice.
The intention of the malicious tenant is to navigate an honest
user to a website of his choice. Being aware of the lack of
enforcement of the display policy by the user’s browser, the
malicious tenant alters his dimensions as shown in Figure 3.
The attacker expands his own iframe and masquerades as the
Amazon and YouTube widgets, while pushing the real Ama-
zon and YouTube widgets “South”, far outside of the user’s
view. Unless the user scrolls down very far on the mashup
website, he is unable to notice the attack. The user perceives
the masqueraded Amazon as the real widget and clicks on
the deals of the attacker’s choice.
The tenant attacker does not necessarily need to know the
widgets present on the victim’s personal profile and the lay-
out of the profile. Mashup websites generally include some
default widgets on a new profile. The attacker can masquer-
ade as any of the default widgets on the website. Unless the
victim is very familiar with the layout of his profile, he will
trust the masqueraded widget. Additionally, if the malicious
widget is published on a well known mashup website, a not-
so-careful user may be willing to click on links he finds inter-
esting irrespective of the credibility of the widget presenting
the links to him.
4.1.2 Password Stealing
Consider a malicious advertisement situated to the ‘North’
of the login box of an honest website. The malicious adver-
tisement can steal a user’s credentials by stretching its own
dimensions and including a fake login box, which looks ex-
actly the same as the honest website’s login box. The real
login box would be pushed down on the user’s phone screen.
Since the user is not able to see all the content on the screen
at the same time, the user will likely enter his credentials in
the fake login box.
4.2 Experimental Evaluation
We built test cases containing a cross-origin tenant on a land-
lord. We verified the compliance of the candidate browsers
with access control policies for four attributes of the tenant
window: position, dimensions, pixels and URL location.
Table 5 lists the access policies for cross-origin landlord
and tenant in the eight mobile browsers. Three out of the
eight mobile browsers do not correctly follow the access
control policy for a tenant’s dimensions when cross-origin
tenant and landlord interact. The Android, Opera Mini and
iPhone Safari browsers allow a tenant of a different origin
than that of the landlord to write its own dimensions. All
three browsers allow an iframe to stretch its own dimensions
to fit the content inside the iframe. Even if the landlord spec-
ifies the dimensions of the iframe, the cross-origin tenant can
change them by putting more content in the iframe. By al-
tering its own dimensions, the tenant’s iframe does not alter
the layout of the original page; rather all other elements on
the screen are adjusted around the new dimensions of the
iframe while retaining the original relative layout. However,
being able to push legitimate content out of the user’s view
allows a malicious tenant to launch phishing and password
stealing attacks. We built the phishing attack described in
Section 4.1.1 on iGoogle and launched it successfully on the
Android, Opera Mini and iPhone Safari browsers.
The Internet explorer browser on Windows 7 phone OS,
Blackberry browser built on Mango engine and the Black-
berry browser built on Webkit comply with the policies for
cross-principal display access control correctly.
4.3 Discussion
Our experiments show that attacks such as phishing and
password stealing are possible against three (Android, Opera
Mini and iPhone Safari) out of eight mobile browsers. A
tenant attacker can launch a phishing attack on any website
supporting uploading of user generated widgets in iframes
by expanding his iframe. An iframe holding more con-
tent than can be displayed is not perceived as a malicious
iframe. Browsers are expected to provide scrolling and re-
strict the write access to the tenant’s dimensions to the land-
lord. Scrolling allows a user to access all the content of the
iframe and also ensures that the tenant resides only in the
area rented out by the landlord. Similar to desktop browsers,
mobile browsers do not treat iframes holding more content
than can be displayed as malicious. Therefore, the phishing
attack is fairly easy to launch on any mashup website allow-
ing user generated content. More importantly, this demon-
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Figure 4: Left image: www.aol.com web page containing a cross-origin malicious advertisement. The browser displays only
the ‘title’ of the page and does not display the address bar.; Right image: Due to the top-level frame navigation policy,
the malicious advertisement can redirect the top-level window to www.attacker.com, which looks exactly the same as AOL’s
website, thereby launching a phishing attack. The user cannot detect the attack since the address bar containing the URL of
the top window is not included in the mobile browser’s view due to space constraint. The Nokia Mini-Map browser is the
most susceptible to this attack. However, all other mobile browsers are also susceptible to this attack due to address bar not
being persistently available while browsing.
strates a significant tension between usability and display se-
curity in mobile browsers.
The same vulnerabilities exist across mobile browsers
built on different rendering engines. For example, the write
access to self dimensions for a cross-original tenant is a
vulnerability seen on the Opera Mini browser built using
Presto engine and the Android and iPhone Safari browsers
built using Webkit. None of the desktop browsers (exclud-
ing Safari desktop) in our tests show the vulnerabilities
found in mobile browsers. Therefore, we conclude that
the non-compliance to display access control policies is
prevalent in popular mobile browsers. This observation
further strengthens the argument that mobile browsers
introduce new security problems and are not simply mini
versions of the desktop software.
5 Top-Level Frame Navigation
Navigation has been considered as part of display in previous
studies [31]. Navigation is defined as an action to change the
location of a window and point it to a new website. When
cross-origin principals interact, a principal’s ability to navi-
gate principals of other origins is governed by the navigation
policies specified by the browser.
Barth et al. have previously noted the top-level frame nav-
igation policy. They state that most browsers allow top-level
frames to be navigated by anyone, because they have an ad-
dress bar [10]. This implies that it is crucial for a user to
always view the address bar in order to make the decision
of credibility of the website and identify a potential phish-
ing attack. All desktop browsers allow a user to always view
the top-level window’s address bar. Therefore, the top-level
frame navigation policy can possibly prevent phishing at-
tacks on a careful user on desktop browsers.
We argue that mobile browsers are considerably different
in handling address bar of the top-level window. Due to the
smaller screen size, once the page is rendered, the address
bar is minimized and cannot be viewed by the user in most
mobile browsers. If the address bar of the top-level window
is not always visible, the following attack is possible.
5.1 Attacks
A tenant attacker (descendant) can launch a phishing attack
very easily if he can navigate the cross-origin top-level win-
dow and the top-level window’s address bar is not visible to
the user.
Consider a web page www.honest.com consisting of a ma-
licious cross-origin advertisement as shown in Figure 4. The
onload event of the advertisement is to navigate the top-
level window to www.attacker.com, which looks exactly the
same as www.honest.com and contains malicious content.
When the advertisement on the honest page is loaded, it nav-
igates the top-level window to the attacker’s page. If the
user’s browser shows the address bar of the top-level win-
dow, the user may be able to detect the phishing attack and
refrain from interacting with the malicious page. However,
if the user’s browser does not show the address bar, the user
cannot detect the phishing attack.
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5.2 Experimental Evaluation
We confirmed our initial observation by evaluating the mo-
bile and desktop browsers. All thirteen mobile and desk-
top browsers allow a descendant principal of any origin to
navigate the top-level window to any source. Five desktop
browsers always display the address bar in the window.
The iPhone Safari browser minimizes the top-level ad-
dress bar for better usability once a page is rendered. The
address bar disappears from view once the user starts inter-
acting with content on the page. This behavior is seen in all
the mobile browsers except Internet Explorer Mobile 8 and
Nokia Mini-Map. Internet Explorer Mobile 8 always dis-
plays the address bar, even when the user accesses content
in the portrait view. However, the address bar is never dis-
played in IE mobile when a user interacts with a web page
in the landscape mode.
In the Nokia Mini-Map browser, the address bar of the
top-level window is never accessible to the user while brows-
ing. We tried all the functionalities provided in options of the
web browser to determine the URL location of the currently
rendered page. However, the Nokia Mini-Map browser does
not provide a functionality to access the address bar. This
makes the Nokia browser the most susceptible to phishing at-
tacks by navigation of top-level window to malicious pages,
since the user can never detect the attack.
5.3 Discussion
Zooming and scrolling are two very important functions of
mobile browsers to perform useful actions. Since these func-
tionalities push the address bar of a web page out of the
user’s sight for most of the time while browsing, the cur-
rent policy for top-level frame navigation is not appropri-
ate for mobile browsers. A more restrictive policy, such as
Gazelle’s top-level frame navigation policy [11] allows only
the top-level window’s tenant and the user to navigate the
top-level window. This approach would better balance is-
sues of usability, specifically screen real-estate, and security.
6 Other Experiments and Results
We evaluate mobile browsers for two other previously stud-
ied navigation policies for desktop browsers.
Earlier studies have advocated the descendant [21] and
child policies [36] for frame navigation. The descendant pol-
icy allows navigation of any descendant of a window. The
child navigation policy is more restrictive than the descen-
dant navigation policy as the child policy allows only the
direct children of a window to be navigated. However, the
descendant navigation policy has been shown to be at con-
flict with the DOM’s Same Origin Policy (SOP) [36, 31].
The descendant policy allows a malicious landlord to change
the logic of a cross-original tenant by navigating the grand-
children frames inside the tenant to a new source. This be-
havior violates the policy for a landlord’s access to the ten-
ant’s private information since the grandchildren frames of
the landlord are private to the tenant. Seven mobile and all
five desktop browsers follow the descendant policy for frame
navigation. The Blackberry browser with the Mango render-
ing engine is the only browser, which implements the child
navigation policy. As a result, we conclude that all but one of
the mobile browsers also suffer from similar vulnerabilities
as their desktop counterparts.
We also studied the history property associated with the
window object of each browser. All browsers except Opera
Mini, Windows Mobile IE and Blackberry Mango allow a
descendant of any origin to navigate the top-level window
back and forth in its array of history URLs. A malicious
descendant can exploit this vulnerability. For example, a
user can be tricked into making multiple purchases of the
same product [31]. Eight out of the thirteen desktop and
mobile browsers used for our studies are vulnerable to this
problem. We note that the desktop browsers and their corre-
sponding mobile versions show the same properties for nav-
igation. For example, both the desktop and mobile versions
of Opera and Windows IE browsers restrict cross-origin ac-
cess to top-level window’s history. The desktop and mobile
versions of the Safari and Firefox browsers allow any cross-
origin descendant principal to navigate the top-level window
in its history.
7 Observations
In this work, we evaluated display security policies in mobile
browsers when display elements overlap, access each other’s
resources and are navigated to a new location. We observed
that iframes are a major source of display-related security
issues in mobile browsers. Iframes are used extensively on
the Web, with more than 40% of the top 100,000 websites
embedding at least one iframe [31]. These websites are pri-
marily meant for desktop browsers and all security consid-
erations are made based on the desktop environment. How-
ever, all these webpages may become susceptible to a range
of attacks when rendered on mobile browsers. For exam-
ple, 40% webpages containing iframes would be susceptible
to attacks due to the iframe’s tenant being able to write its
own dimensions in the Android, Opera Mini and iPhone Sa-
fari browsers. Moreover, 1.2% of the top 100,000 sites with
transparent, overlapping cross-origin iframes [31] would po-
tentially suffer from overlapping vulnerabilities presented in
Section 3.1. This gives us an initial estimate of the back-
ward compatibility cost of fixing the security issues due to
overlapping iframes if browser vendors decide to use more
stringent overlap policies such as opaque policy [36]. We
plan to improve such estimates to include mobile websites
as part of our future work.
Some interesting observations can be made from the com-
parison between desktop and mobile versions of the same
browsers. While it is expected that browsers from the same
vendor (such as Safari, Firefox, Opera and IE in our eval-
uation) would have similar security policies for both their
desktop and mobile versions, we found that browsers devi-
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ate considerably from this expectation. With the exception
of the mobile and desktop version of the IE browser, all the
other desktop and mobile browser pairs from the same ven-
dor do not implement the same security policies for display.
For example, the Opera Mini browser does not follow the
proposed user access policy and also allows a cross-origin
tenant to write its own dimensions allowing a wide range of
attacks. The Opera desktop browser is not susceptible to any
of the attacks shown on Opera Mini due to correctly comply-
ing with display policies. The mobile and desktop versions
of Firefox and Safari browsers also show differences in ad-
hering to display security policies.
Another interesting observation is that the display-related
security issues on mobile browsers are not restricted to
one rendering engine. For example, the vulnerabilities
caused due to incorrect handling of overlapping elements are
present on browsers built using the Presto, Gecko and We-
bkit engine. This implies that similar security design issues
exist across browser engines. Moreover, we observed the
popular browsers to be more vulnerable to attacks as com-
pared to others. For example, the Opera Mini browser is the
most popular browser on mobile phones and we discovered
Opera susceptible to most of the potential attacks.
Smaller screen size and optimized functionalities for con-
strained hardware as compared to desktop browsers is the
possible reason behind the rendering problems found in this
paper. However, we believe that rendering is only one of the
many aspects that differentiate mobile browsers from their
desktop counterparts. There are other differences in desktop
and mobile environments such as lesser processing power
and lesser memory, which may also play an important role in
defining a user’s web experience on a mobile phone. For ex-
ample, since flash consumes considerable memory and pro-
cessing power, it was not available on mobile phones for a
fairly long time. With mobile phones becoming all purpose
computing systems, the gap between desktops and mobile
phones as two computing systems is closing very fast. How-
ever, certain differences such as screen size will remain the
same to continue supporting portability. We plan to extend
our work to analyze other differences between the two en-
vironments, including session management and handling of
cookies; and how these differences influence the effective-
ness of their security policies.
Despite our effort to be comprehensive, we may have
missed some display-related issues existing in today’s
browsers. We hope our work to be a start for a commu-
nity effort on mapping out the full set of safe browser access
control policies for mobile platforms.
8 Related Work
Desktop browsers have been shown to be vulnerable to a
variety of attacks in the past including Cross Site Script-
ing [18], Cross Site Request Forgery [20], clickjacking [4,
5, 29] and phishing. In addition to weak security policies,
implementation errors in the browser code [22], inconsis-
tencies in access control policies [31], absence of wide de-
ployment of policies [37] and incorrect handling of privi-
leges in browser extensions [19] further increase the threats
to the browser and the user. To protect browsers from at-
tacks, a range of defenses have been proposed including im-
plementing new HTTP headers [20], enforcing new secu-
rity policies [25, 32, 27] and algorithm [18, 16] and devel-
opment of tools to find potential security vulnerabilities in
browsers [17].
The increasing interplay of cross-domain principals by
complex websites demands resource handling in the browser
similar to an operating system. The OP Web browser [26]
was the first to design a small browser kernel to enforce new
browser security features and handle resources. Gazelle [36]
and Chrome [11] also proposed new browser architectures
for separating the functionality of the browser from security
mechanisms and policies. King et al [33] continued the de-
sign philosophy through the Illinois browser OS by directly
mapping browser abstractions to hardware abstractions.
Smart phones have become multipurpose computing plat-
forms. Portability makes them an attractive platform to
host applications and browse Web. However, malicious mo-
bile applications can affect user privacy [24, 23] and poten-
tially harm the cellular network [35]. Increasing user base
has made mobile browsers an attractive target for attack-
ers [30, 9, 6, 13, 3, 7]. Researchers have already begun to
think about defending against attacks on mobile phones us-
ing smart CDNs [28]. Although mobile browsers will be
targets of security attacks in the coming years, security is-
sues in mobile browsers will be new since the devices have
serious limitations compared to desktops. However, a large-
scale security analysis of the differences between mobile and
desktop browsers has not yet been performed.
9 Conclusion
Mobile web browsers have been long thought of as the mini-
versions of their desktop counterparts. In this paper, we take
the first step towards analyzing the differences between mo-
bile and desktop browsers from the point of view of security.
We focus our analysis on display-related security issues. We
identify two separate classes of security problems in mo-
bile browsers and devise several real-world attacks against
them. Additionally, we identify an existing security policy
for display on desktop browsers that is inappropriate on mo-
bile browsers. We perform a comprehensive analysis of eight
mobile and five desktop browsers to determine the display-
related differences between the two. We observe that desk-
top browsers are more compliant with display-related secu-
rity policies as compared to their mobile counterparts. More-
over, we show that limitations (especially screen size) make
the failure to enforce such policies even more dangerous
in the mobile space. We conclude that not only do mobile
browsers bring in new security challenges but also that they
are not mini-versions of their desktop counterparts.
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